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I argue that some important elements of the current cosmological model are 'conventionalist’ in the
sense defined by Karl Popper. These elements include dark matter and dark energy; both are auxiliary
hypotheses that were invoked in response to observations that falsified the standard model as it existed
at the time. The use of conventionalist stratagems in response to unexpected observations implies that
the field of cosmology is in a state of 'degenerating problemshift’ in the language of Imre Lakatos. I show
that the 'concordance’ argument, often put forward by cosmologists in support of the current paradigm,
is weaker than the convergence arguments that were made in the past in support of the atomic theory of
matter or the quantization of energy.
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The idea that scientific theories contain ‘conventional’ aspects
is attributed to Henri Poincaré (Poincaré, 1902). From his work on
non-Euclidean geometries and higher spaces, Poincaré reached the
conclusion that many elements of scientific theories which had
been held to be fundamental truths were in fact just conventions.
Thus any geometry can be adopted for space, if the necessary re-
vision is made in the definition of a straight line. The laws of
mechanics can likewise be interpreted as defining the concepts of
force and inertial motion. While noting that some conventions
might be more convenient than others, Poincaré asserted that any
set of conventions could always be replaced by a different set
without changing the content of a theory. In Poincaré's view, the
parts of a scientific theory that are conventional cannot be said to
be true or false; they are simply definitions, and as such, are im-
mune to testing.
Unlike Poincaré, Pierre Duhem (1914) believed that experi-
mental refutation of a theoretical system is possible. Nor did Du-
hem accept that any part of a theory could be singled out as de-
finitional. Nevertheless, Duhem, like Poincaré, is often regarded as
a conventionalist. Duhem noted that the prediction that a phe-
nomenon will be observed is based on a set of premises, including
laws, initial conditions, assumptions about the reliability of the
experimental apparatus etc. In the face of a falsifying instance, thetd. This is an open access article unexperimenter has no way of knowing which of these premises is
false. Thus, no experiment or observation can ever be considered
decisive against a particular hypothesis, and no hypothesis can be
conclusively falsified.
Karl Popper was concerned with finding a criterion that de-
marcates science from non-science (or ‘metaphysics’). He argued
that falsifiability is such a criterion: scientific theories are falsifi-
able; non-falsifiable theories are non-scientific. Popper acknowl-
edged the strength of the conventionalist position: “I regard con-
ventionalism as a system which is self-contained and defensible”
(Popper, 1959, p. 80). But Popper equated conventionalism with
non-falsifiability, and he rejected it, in part because he saw con-
ventionalism as impeding the growth of knowledge:
Whenever the ‘classical’ system of the day is threatened by the
results of new experiments which might be interpreted as falsi-
fications according to my point of view, the system will appear
unshaken to the conventionalist. He will explain away the in-
consistencies which may have arisen…We, and those who share
our attitude, will hope to make new discoveries; and we shall
hope to be helped in this by a newly erected scientific system.
Thus we shall take the greatest interest in the falsifying experi-
ment. We shall hail it as a success, for it has opened up new vistas
into a world of new experiences. (Popper, 1959, p. 80.).
Popper nevertheless acknowledged that the “conventionalist mode
of thought” is useful, in that it can expose certain logical short-
comings in his doctrine of falsification:der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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tems of the natural sciences are not verifiable, but I assert that
they are not falsifiable either. For there is always the possibility
of '… attaining, for any chosen axiomatic system, what is called
its “correspondence with reality” ’ (Carnap 1923, p. 100); and
this can be done in a number of ways… Thus we may introduce
ad hoc hypotheses. Or we may modify the so-called 'ostensive
definitions’… Or we may adopt a sceptical attitude as to the
reliability of the experimenter whose observations, which
threaten our system, we may exclude from science on the
ground that they are insufficiently supported, unscientific, or
not objective, or even on the ground that the experimenter was
a liar…. In the last resort we can always cast doubt on the
acumen of the theoretician. (Popper, 1959, p. 81.).
Popper coined the term ‘conventionalist stratagem’ to describe
these four ways of evading the consequences of a falsifying ex-
periment. While admitting that there was no strictly logical basis
on which to exclude such stratagems, he argued that in order to
maintain falsifiability, conventionalist methods needed to be
strictly avoided, and that “The only way to avoid conventionalism
is by taking a decision: the decision not to apply its methods. We
decide that, in the case of a threat to our system, we will not save
it by any kind of conventionalist stratagem” (Popper, 1959, p. 82).
Popper presented methodological rules for the practice of science
that were designed to rule out the incorporation of conventionalist
elements.1
Critics of Popper have debated whether falsification is a pri-
mary goal of scientists. Thomas Kuhn (1962) famously argued that
the main occupation of scientists is not falsification but ‘puzzle-
solving,’ an activity that implies uncritical acceptance of the cur-
rent scientific paradigm. However, interpreted narrowly as a de-
finition of the conventionalist program, Popper’s list of stratagems
need not be problematic. In what follows, I identify ‘con-
ventionalism’ with Popper’s list. A ‘conventionalist’ approach is
defined as one which (whether deliberately or not) evades the
consequences of a falsifying experiment or observation by the
application of one or more of Popper’s conventionalist stratagems.2. The standard model of cosmology
At any given time, discrepancies exist between the predictions
of an accepted scientific theory and the experiments or observa-
tions that test those predictions. Kuhn argued that most such
discrepancies, which he called ‘anomalies’, are not viewed by sci-
entists as falsifying instances. Rather, they are considered puzzles
to be solved within the existing paradigm.
The standard model of cosmology2 is not exceptional in this
regard. The list of anomalies is impressively long, and some of
them have persisted so stubbornly and for so long a time that they
have achieved the status of ‘named’ problems. Examples include
the ‘Lithium problem’ (Fields, 2011); the ‘core-cusp problem' (de
Blok, 2010); the ‘missing satellites problem’ (Moore et al., 1999);
the ‘too big to fail problem’ (Boylan-Kolchin, Bullock & Kaplinghat,
2011); and the ‘missing baryons problem’ (McGaugh, 2008). In1 In so doing, Popper showed himself to be a conventionalist with regard to
methodology (Akinci, 2004).
2 Here and below, the ‘standard model of cosmology’ refers to the ‘ΛCDM
[Lambda-cold-dark-matter] model’ or the ‘concordance’ or ‘benchmark’ cosmolo-
gical model as it is presented in current textbooks and review articles. That model
purports to describe the universe going back to times as early as the era of ‘big-
bang nucleosynthesis’ (BBN) and possibly earlier. The discussion in this paper refers
to the evolution of the universe from the era of BBN until the present. There is
nearly perfect unanimity concerning the predictions of the standard model over
this interval of time; for a list of representative texts, see Table 1.textbooks and review articles, these discrepancies are rarely de-
scribed as falsifying; they are presented rather as problems that
remain to be solved from within the existing paradigm.3 Typical is
the following statement by Malcolm Longair in the 2008 mono-
graph Galaxy Formation: “There is no limit to the ingenuity of as-
tronomers and astrophysicists in finding ways of reconciling the-
ory and observation. As more parameters are included in the
models, the easier it will be to effect the reconciliation of theory
with observation” (p. 419).
At the same time, there have been instances since the 1960s
where anomalies were interpreted by the community as being
incompatible with the cosmological model as it existed at the
time. A famous example is the discovery around 1998 that the
expansion of the universe is accelerating, rather than decelerating
as the standard model had predicted.
It is with the latter sort of discrepancy that this paper is con-
cerned: that is: discrepancies that seem immune to reconciliation
by (as Longair might say) adjusting the parameters of astro-
physical theory. Three such instances are identified below. In each
case, it will be argued that the response of the scientific commu-
nity (whether intentionally or not) has been conventionalist in the
sense defined by Popper. On this view, some essential components
of the current, standard model of cosmology—including dark
matter and dark energy—owe their existence to conventionalist
stratagems.3. Popper’s “conventionalist stratagems”
Herbert Keuth (2005) provides a succinct re-statement of
Popper’s four conventionalist stratagems:
(i) we may introduce ad hoc hypotheses (which make refuting
evidence seem irrelevant); (ii) we may modify the so-called
ostensive definitions (so as to alter the content of a hypothesis
and thus possibly its truth value); (iii) we may doubt the re-
liability of the experimenter (and declare his observations that
threaten the tested theory to be irrelevant); (iv) we may doubt
the acumen of the theoretician (who does not produce ideas
that can save the tested theory). (Keuth, 2005, p. 72.).
Popper believed that scientists should avoid such stratagems, and
to that end, he proposed a set of methodological rules that were
designed to preserve falsifiability (Popper, 1959, chapter 4). Now,
nothing in the present work is intended as prescriptive: neither the
content of the current model of cosmology, nor the methodology
that led to that content, are being critiqued here. Popper’s pre-
scriptivist rules are therefore not of direct interest; nor are the
criticisms, by others, of those rules, of which there are many.
However, in the process of specifying how falsifiability could be
preserved, Popper sharpened and clarified the definitions of the
four conventionalist stratagems, and those clarifications will be
useful in what follows.
The first stratagem employs ‘ad hoc hypotheses’.4 Popper
writes:
As regards auxiliary hypotheses we decide to lay down the rule
that only those are acceptable whose introduction does not
diminish the degree of falsifiability or testability of the system
in question, but on the contrary, increases it…. If the degree of
falsifiability is increased, then introducing the hypothesis has3 An exception is Kroupa’s (2012) closely-reasoned argument that many of the
outstanding anomalies should be considered falsifying. See also Kroupa, Pawlowski,
and Milgrom (2012).
4 Popper uses the terms ‘ad hoc hypothesis’ and ‘auxiliary hypothesis’
synonymously.
5 But see note 3.
6 The descriptions of gravitation and motion in the standard model of cos-
mology are Einstein’s, not Newton’s, but the predictions of these two theories are
indistinguishable in the low-acceleration regime considered in this section.
7 This follows the sometimes confusing practice of astrophysicists to use the
term ‘acceleration’ both to mean ‘rate of change of velocity’ and ‘gravitational force
per unit of mass’ (where ‘mass’ refers to the body on which the force acts).
8 kpc¼kiloparsec¼3.091021 cm.
9 This statement assumes that there is no density inhomogeneity that in-
creases the local acceleration above the mean value determined by the overall mass
of the Galaxy. In the Solar system, for instance, the acceleration exceeds a0 ev-
erywhere due to the presence of the Sun.
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more than it did previously: it prohibits more. (Popper, 1959,
pp. 82–83).
By referring to “the system in question”, Popper appears to be
saying that the theory plus the auxiliary hypothesis should have a
higher degree of falsifiability than the theory alone. Now, Ingvar
Johansson (1975, p. 54) makes the point that an auxiliary hy-
pothesis is only introduced when a theory appears to have been
falsified. Suppose (as would normally be the case) that the aux-
iliary hypothesis explains the anomaly (in the way that ‘dark en-
ergy’ explains the observed acceleration of the universe, or ‘dark
matter’ explains galaxy rotation curves). If the auxiliary hypothesis
lacks potential falsifiers itself, the degree of falsifiability of the
system (theory plus auxiliary hypothesis) would necessarily be
reduced. In what follows, I will argue that the addition of an
auxiliary hypothesis to a theory is conventionalist insofar as it
lacks potential falsifiers itself.
The second conventionalist stratagem consists of changing the
“ostensive definitions” in such a way that a previously falsifying
observation is no longer inconsistent with the theory. Popper ac-
knowledges that some changes in definitions are permissible, but
“they must be regarded as modifications of the system, which
thereafter has to be re-examined as if it were new” (Popper, 1959,
pp. 83–84).
As regards the third and fourth stratagems, Popper says only
“As to the two remaining points in our list…we shall adopt similar
rules. Inter-subjectively testable experiments are either to be ac-
cepted, or to be rejected in the light of counter-experiments.”
(Popper, 1959, p. 84.) Following Freeman (1973), I equate Popper’s
‘intersubjective agreement’ with ‘objectivity’, as that term is used
by practicing scientists, and take his statement to refer to ex-
periments or observations that have been confirmed by in-
dependent researchers. Now, stratagem number three consists of
ignoring an observation or experiment for one reason or another.
Here I make the (obvious) point that—if an observation or ex-
periment made by one researcher is ignored by another researcher
—it is quite possible that the latter will not give a reason for doing
so. Indeed s/he may not mention the experiment at all; or if a
reason is given, it may not be the actual reason. I therefore do not
insist that the reasons for ignoring a falsifying experiment or ob-
servation be stated, but only that it be ignored, or at least that its
falsifying consequences are ignored.
But which experiments or observations should be regarded as
falsifying, so that in ignoring them, a scientist is engaging in
conventionalism? Clearly some experimental results are more
damaging to a theory than others. Popper notes that
A theory is tested not merely by applying it, or by trying it out,
but by applying it to very special cases—cases for which it
yields results different from those we should have expected
without that theory, or in the light of other theories. In other
words we try to select for our tests those crucial cases in which
we should expect the theory to fail if it is not true. (Popper,
1962, p.112).
Further on, Popper defines a test as “severe” if it confronts a pre-
diction that was “highly improbable in the light of our previous
knowledge” (Ibid, p. 220). I will decide that a decision to ignore a
discrepancy is conventionalist, to the degree that the ignored
observation constitutes a “severe” test in the sense defined by
Popper.
Popper’s fourth stratagem consists of “cast[ing] doubt on the
acumen of the theoretician” when s/he fails to find a way to ex-
plain the observation within the current theoretical system. As
noted above, theoretical astrophysicists devote considerable effort
to reconciling observational anomalies with the standard model ofcosmology; such activity constitutes part of what Kuhn calls
‘normal science’. Popper’s fourth conventionalist stratagem is es-
sentially identical to Kuhn’s puzzle-solving, and I will take it for
granted in what follows.5 The focus here is on discrepancies that
seem immune to reconciliation by ‘adjusting the parameters’ of
astrophysical theory.4. Dark matter
Newton’s laws of motion relate acceleration to force; his law of
universal gravitation relates gravitational force to mass.6 Astro-
physical observations provide an opportunity to test Newton’s
laws in a regime that is not accessible in the laboratory, or indeed
anywhere in the Solar System: the regime of very low
acceleration.7 Stars or gas clouds orbiting near the outskirts of
galaxies like the Milky Way are used as ‘test particles’; a measured
velocity, V, is converted into a (centripetal) acceleration, a, via
a¼V2/r where r is the distance of the star or gas cloud from the
center of the galaxy, under the assumption that motion takes place
in a circular orbit. The measured acceleration is then compared
with the acceleration predicted by Newton’s law of gravitation.
The two results are found to be in systematic and spectacular
disagreement (Rubin, Thonnard & Ford, 1978; Bosma, 1981).
Measured rotation velocities are greater, and sometimes much
greater, than would be expected if the force responsible for the
acceleration was produced by the observed mass (stars, gas) of the
galaxy. Empirically, the discrepancy manifests itself wherever in a
galaxy the acceleration predicted by Newton's law of gravitation
falls below a value a0E1010 m s2 (Milgrom, 1983; Sanders,
1990; Begeman, Broeils & Sanders, 1991; McGaugh, 2011). In the
Milky Way, this occurs at distances from the galaxy center greater
than about 6 kpc8 (Sellwood & Sanders, 1988)9; by comparison, the
Sun’s distance from the Galactic center is about 8 kpc.
One could imagine responding to this anomaly by modifying
Newton’s laws of motion or his law of gravitation or both (Mil-
grom, 1983). Such modifications would be falsifiable, in the sense
of making definite predictions about V as a function of r in a galaxy
with a known distribution of mass.
The standard model of cosmology deals with this anomaly in a
different way: via an auxiliary hypothesis. It is postulated that
galaxies are embedded in ‘dark matter haloes’: approximately
spherical systems composed of some kind of distributed matter
that does not interact significantly with radiation but which does
generate and respond to gravitational forces. Newton’s laws of
motion are retained; velocities predicted from those laws are lar-
ger because the total mass (normal plus dark) that generates the
gravitational force is larger. In order to be consistent with the run
of V vs. r in observed galaxies, the density of the dark matter
would need to vary, approximately, as the inverse square of dis-
tance from the galaxy’s center, and the normalization of the dark
matter density (its value at some specified r) would need to be
adjusted so that the enclosed, total mass begins to be dominated
by dark matter at radii where the acceleration due to the normal
D. Merritt / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 57 (2017) 41–5244matter falls below a0. Under this hypothesis, the total amount of
dark matter in a galaxy would typically exceed the total amount of
ordinary matter (stars, gas) by an order of magnitude or more.
When attempting to reproduce the rotation curve (i.e. the plot
of V vs. r) of an individual galaxy, the parameters describing the
putative dark-matter halo are typically varied, arbitrarily, in order
to give the best fit to the data. In this limited sense, the dark
matter hypothesis can be said to be non-falsifiable, since essen-
tially any observed rotation curve can be fit by adjusting the as-
sumed dark matter density appropriately.
This aspect of non-falsifiability of the dark matter hypothesis
need not be considered fundamental. Following Duhem, one can
argue that the dark matter distribution around a given galaxy is
determined by that galaxy’s initial conditions and its unique his-
tory of evolution and interaction with other galaxies. Since these
additional factors can not be well known, the best one might hope
for theoretically is to predict certain statistical or average prop-
erties of dark matter: the average ratio of dark to luminous matter;
the relative degree of central concentration of the two compo-
nents; the degree of clustering on super-galactic scales etc.
Attempts starting in the 1980s to do this quickly revealed the
need to augment the dark-matter hypothesis in one important
way: the dark matter must be ‘cold’, i.e., the particles10 making up
the dark matter must have been moving non-relativistically at the
time of structure formation; otherwise they would move so fast as
to preclude their clumping gravitationally into structures with the
sizes and densities inferred for the dark haloes. This condition on
the velocities of dark matter particles can be converted into a
condition on the particle mass, mχ, under certain, additional as-
sumptions about how the dark matter ‘decoupled’ from ordinary
matter in the early universe. In order for the dark matter particles
to be sufficiently ‘cold’ (i.e. slowly moving), these additional as-
sumptions require mχ≳1 GeV/c
2.11 Numerical simulations of the
gravitational clumping of ‘cold dark matter’ have been shown to
reproduce certain statistical properties of the distribution of ga-
laxies and galactic systems, although many anomalies (in the
sense defined by Kuhn) remain; indeed several of the ‘named’
problems mentioned in Section 2 refer to a particular manner in
which these simulations fail to reproduce the observations of ga-
laxies and galactic systems.
What would constitute a crucial experiment for testing the cold
dark matter hypothesis? — Clearly, an experiment that is sensitive
to the presence or absence of the dark matter particles
themselves.12 Now, a statement like “Dark matter particles exist” is
an existential generalization, hence it is verifiable but not falsifi-
able. (A single dark-matter particle could always exist, undetected,
in a galaxy far away.) However, as Popper points out (Popper, 1983,
pp. 178–185), existential statements are often accompanied by
qualifications arising out of the scientific context in which they are
presented, rendering them falsifiable. In the case of cold dark
matter, the particles that are postulated to make it up must have a
particular local density and velocity distribution if they are to
explain the Milky Way rotation curve. Some of the hypothesized10 That the dark matter is particulate is generally assumed, although other
possibilities have been discussed; see Bertone (2010, Chapters 9–11).
11 GeV¼billion electron volts, c¼speed of light. One GeV/c2 is a mass of
1.781027 kg. The mass of the proton is 0.94 GeV/c2.
12 Dark matter particles might also be created in particle accelerators, like the
Large Hadron Collider. In the words of G. Bertone and J. Silk, “The discovery of new
particles [in accelerator experiments] would be per se an extraordinary discovery,
but it might not allow a straightforward identification with a successful DM [dark
matter] candidate… progress will only be achieved by observing cold dark matter
directly” (Bertone, 2010, p. 10). Similar considerations apply to so-called ‘indirect
detection’ methods (as recently reviewed by Gaskins, 2016), which require a
number of additional assumptions before an observed event can be interpreted in
terms of dark matter.particles must therefore be passing, at any given moment, through
an Earth-based laboratory, with a distribution of velocities that is
at least approximately known; an experimental demonstration of
their absence would constitute a falsification. Now, the Milky Way
rotation curve implies a mass density of the dark matter of about
0.4 GeV/c2 cm3 at the location of the Earth (Catena and Ullio,
2012; Pato, Iocco & Bertone, 2015). The predicted number density
of the dark matter particles is therefore 0.04/m10 cm3 where
m10¼mχ/(10 GeV/c2) is the assumed particle mass in units of
10 GeV/c2. Elastic collisions between a dark matter particle and
normal matter could transfer kinetic energy to the latter; passage
of a dark matter particle through a laboratory detector could in
principle be observed using one of a number of well-established
techniques based on ionization, scintillation or calorimetry. These
ideas are the basis for so-called ‘direct detection’ experiments, a
number of which have been in operation since the mid 1980s.13
These experiments have so far failed to detect dark matter
particles.14 But regardless of how sensitive the experiments be-
come, non-detection will never constitute a falsification of the
cold-dark-matter hypothesis. Laboratory detection of a dark mat-
ter particle requires that both the number density of the particles
at the Earth, and the cross-section, sχ, for a dark matter particle to
interact with normal matter, be sufficiently large. As discussed
above, the number density depends on the particle mass mχ, for
which a plausible lower limit can be placed. But nothing what-
soever is known about sχ. A non-detection in the laboratory
therefore implies only an upper limit on sχ at any given value of
mχ. If no detection occurs, it may simply mean that the dark
matter particles have a very low cross-section for interaction with
normal matter; it can not be interpreted to mean that the particles
are not present in the detector.15
No particle having the properties of the putative dark matter
particle exists within the standard model of particle physics, and
theoretical speculations about the probability of direct detection
are often presented in the context of some alternative to, or ex-
tension of, that model. Probably the most common choice is
supersymmetry.16 At the time of the first direct-detection experi-
ments, an interaction cross section sχ of approximately 10
39 cm2
(at mχ¼50 GeV) was considered ‘natural’ by theoretical physicists
working on supersymmetry. Such values for sχ were ruled out
already by the mid 1990s (Fig. 1, left panel). Current experimental
upper limits on sχ are about six orders of magnitude smaller;
particle physicists have accommodated the persistent non-detec-
tion by constructing supersymmetric models in which the parti-
cles constituting the dark matter have correspondingly smaller
interaction cross sections (Fig. 1, right panel). In principle, adop-
tion of a well-defined particle physics model could render the
cold-dark-matter hypothesis falsifiable, by allowing definite pre-
dictions to be made about the properties of the dark matter par-
ticles. At least at the present time, theoretical alternatives to the
standard model of particle physics are not well enough defined to
do that.1713 For recent reviews of dark-matter direct detection techniques and results see
Cerdeño & Green (2010), Cushman et al. (2013), Olive et al. (2014), Marrodán Un-
dagoitia & Rauch (2016).
14 One group has claimed detection (Bernabei et al., 2000, 2013). This claim is
not widely credited, primarily because other experiments, some even more sen-
sitive, have failed to verify it (see review by Marrodán Undagoitia & Rauch, 2016).
15 Less plausible hypotheses could also be invented to explain the lack of a
detection; for instance, that the Earth is located in a local “hole” with respect to the
dark matter.
16 See e.g. Olive et al. (2014) for a review of the motivation behind super-
symmetry. In supersymmetric models, every known elementary particle has a
supersymmetric partner, with a spin differing by half a unit.
17 One might argue, rather, that the direct detection experiments have the
potential to falsify some proposed extensions to the standard model of particle
physics, at least in the context of the standard cosmological model.
20 One is reminded of the conclusion reached by some chemists in the 18th
century that phlogiston must have a negative mass, in order to reproduce the
observed gain in weight of some metals after burning; see Partington and McKie
(1981).
21 gμν is the ‘metric tensor’ and Gμν is the ‘Einstein tensor’, both of which are
related algebraically to space–time curvature.
22 This is the Λ that lends its name to ΛCDM.
23 Since the matter density decreases with time as the universe expands, this
near coincidence implies that we are living at a special time. This is one of several
ways in which the standard model appears to be uncomfortably ‘fine-tuned’ (see
e.g. Schneider, 2015, pp. 204–209).
24 Cosmologists typically express this freedom in terms of a dependence of ε
on p, the so-called ‘equation of state’ of the dark energy, rather than a dependence
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That the universe is expanding follows from the observed fact
that light from distant galaxies is redshifted, i.e., features of known
rest-wavelength in the spectra of galaxies are shifted toward
longer wavelengths, indicating motion away from us. Furthermore
the speed of recession (computed via Doppler’s formula) is ob-
served to increase with distance to the galaxy, in roughly a linear
fashion (‘Hubble’s law’). Now, in the absence of forces other than
gravity, Einstein’s equations predict that the rate of expansion of a
homogeneous and isotropic universe should decrease over time,
since the gravitational attraction between all the matter in the
universe continually opposes the expansion. Depending on the
amount of matter in the universe, the universe would either be
expected to expand without limit, although at an ever decreasing
rate (‘open Universe’), or it could reach a maximum size and then
recollapse under the influence of gravity (‘closed Universe’). The
third possibility, a ‘critical Universe’, would tend asymptotically to
a state of zero expansion after infinite time and after reaching
infinite extent.
Which of these three possibilities describes the actual universe
can be determined from observations, at least if Einstein’s equa-
tions are assumed to be correct. One technique is to extend the
‘Hubble diagram’, the plot of Doppler shift vs. distance, to very
distant galaxies, distant enough that (roughly speaking) their light
was emitted at a time when the cosmological rate of expansion
was significantly different than it is now. Starting around 1997,
attempts to do this reached the conclusion that the expansion is
accelerating, not decelerating as had been predicted (Riess et al.,
1998; Perlmutter et al., 1999). Furthermore the data suggest that
the Universe has been in its accelerating phase for roughly the last
six billion years.
One could respond to this anomaly by modifying Einstein’s
theory of gravity, in such a way that an accelerating universe
would be predicted in spite of the tendency of gravity to decele-
rate the expansion (Dvali, Gabadadze & Porrati, 2000; Freese and
Lewis, 2002; Carroll, Duvvuri, Trodden & Turner, 2004). Alter-
natively, one could retain Einstein’s equations, but relinquish the
assumption of homogeneity. If the Earth lies near the center of a
large (103 Mpc18) region of underdensity (compared with the
large-scale average), the Hubble diagram, as measured from the
Earth, could have the observed form, even in the absence of a
cosmic acceleration (Garcia-Bellido and Haugbølle, 2008). Both
hypotheses are falsifiable: in the former case via laboratory ex-
periments (Gubser and Khoury, 2004) or tests of gravity on solar-
system scales (Dvali 2003); in the latter case, by galaxy counts or
observations of asymmetries in the big-bang relic radiation (Kar-
achentsev, 2012; Caldwell and Stebbins, 2008)19.
The standard model of cosmology deals with this anomaly in a
different way: via an auxiliary hypothesis. It is postulated that the
universe is filled with a fluid, called ‘dark energy’, that has what-
ever properties are needed to convert the predicted cosmological
deceleration into an acceleration, and in just such a manner as to
reproduce the observed dependence of galaxy redshift on dis-
tance. Einstein’s theory of gravity is retained, as are the other as-
sumptions (large scale homogeneity and isotropy) that underlie
the standard cosmological model. Mathematically, dark energy
appears as a new set of terms in the stress-energy tensor Tμν of
Einstein’s field equations; the properties of the dark energy that
must be specified in order to solve that equation are its energy
density ε and its pressure p, and their dependence on the18 Mpc¼megaparsec¼3.091024 cm.
19 In fact, there is evidence for a substantial underdensity on a scale of 300 Mpc
around the Sun (Keenan, Barger & Cowie, 2013).cosmological scale factor. In order to reproduce the observed ac-
celeration (in spite of the tendency of gravity to decelerate the
expansion), dark energy must have one surprising property: its
pressure must be negative, i.e. po0.20
Mathematically, there is a choice for ε and p that is particularly
convenient: the energy density is set to a constant value (with
respect to time), and the pressure is also assumed to be constant
and to equal ε. With these additional Ansätze, Einstein’s equa-
tion,
= πμν μνG GT8 ,
becomes simply21
Λ= π − ( )μν μν μνG GT g8 1
where Tμν is the energy–momentum tensor of the matter (normal
plus dark) alone and Λ is a constant given by
Λ ε= π ( )G c8 / 22
with c the speed of light. In this (standard) version of the dark-
energy hypothesis, only a single new parameter, Λ, appears in the
equations that describe the evolutionwith time of the cosmic scale
factor.22 Given this additional parameter to vary, the observed
Hubble diagram can be fit; the data do not yield a unique value of
Λ, rather they yield an approximately linear relation between Λ
and the assumed density of matter (normal plus dark): the larger
the first, the larger the second. Given likely values of the matter
density (derived using the sort of data discussed in the previous
section), one infers a value ofΛ such that the equivalent density of
the dark energy, ρΛ≡ε/c2¼Λ/8πG, is of the same order as the
density of matter at the current epoch.23
The dark energy hypothesis allows one to fit any observed
cosmic expansion history by adjusting the dependence of ε and p
on time24 (Woodard, 2007). In this limited respect, the dark en-
ergy hypothesis is not falsifiable. The situation here is similar to
that regarding dark matter, in the sense that the density of dark
matter around any galaxy can always be adjusted in such a way as
to reproduce any observed rotation curve.
In the case of dark matter, it was argued that a critical ex-
periment would be one that was sensitive to the presence of the
dark matter particles. Can one imagine designing a similar ex-
periment that tests the dark energy hypothesis?
The straightforward answer is “no”. Whereas the particulate
nature of dark matter is taken nearly for granted by adherents to
the ΛCDM model,25 dark energy is sufficiently mysterious that
nothing even approaching a consensus exists regarding its fun-
damental nature. The vagueness of the dark-energy hypothesis
mitigates against its testability, to an even greater degree than in
the case of dark matter.of either quantity on time.
25 In the words of Funk (2015): “Today, it is widely accepted that dark matter
exists and that it is very likely composed of elementary particles.” The technically
challenging (and very expensive) direct-detection experiments described in the
previous section would hardly be carried out (or funded) if this were not the case.
D. Merritt / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 57 (2017) 41–5246The falsifiability of the dark energy hypothesis might be im-
proved by specifying more clearly the nature of the dark energy.
But this is not assured. There is a wide class of dark-energy models
which can be shown to have negligible experimental con-
sequences on scales less than 105 pc (Frampton, 2004, 2006;
Branchina, Liberto & Lodato, 2009).6. The mass discrepancy–acceleration relation
The prima facie case for dark matter is based on the fact that
velocities observed in the outskirts of galaxies are higher than
predicted by Newton’s laws: that is: V4VNewton. This discrepancy
is striking enough, but there is an even more remarkable property
of the rotation curve data (Milgrom, 1988; Sanders, 1990; Sancisi
2004; McGaugh, 2004). It turns out that the degree to which the
measured velocities are too high (compared with the Newtonian
prediction) is strictly predictable, point by point, in every galaxy so
far observed, given only the local density of normal matter. In
other words: the dark matter—which, putatively, dominates the
galaxy’s total mass budget and determines V—somehow knows to
distribute itself in a way that strictly respects the distribution of
the normal matter in every galaxy.
One aspect of this empirical relation was mentioned above:
observed velocities exceed predicted velocities only where the
gravitational acceleration26 produced by the normal matter,
aNewton, falls below a certain, apparently universal, value a0 (Mil-
grom, 1983; Sanders, 1990). This is remarkable enough, since
nothing in Newton’s or Einstein’s descriptions of gravity or motion
predicts that the behavior of a dynamical system should change,
qualitatively, below some particular acceleration.27
But what is even more mysterious is that the local ratio be-
tween observed and expected velocities, V/VNewton, is found to be
strictly predictable given only the observed distribution of normal
matter28 in the galaxy. This result is illustrated in Fig. 2, which
plots the ‘mass discrepancy–acceleration’ relation — so called
because V/VNewton measures the ‘missing mass’, i.e. the degree to
which the gravitational acceleration exceeds that which would be
produced by the observed matter. The relation is empirical, but it
is very tight (as empirical relations in astrophysics go); the scatter
appears to be attributable entirely to measurement errors, i.e., the
intrinsic scatter is consistent with zero (McGaugh, 2004).
At points in a galaxy where aNewton44a0, one observes
VEVNewton; Newton’s laws apparently hold and there is no need
for dark matter. This is the case near the centers of some galaxies,
e.g., the Milky Way. At the other extreme, where aNewtonooa0,
which is typically the case in the outskirts of galaxies, the em-
pirical relation of Fig. 2 is well approximated as
≃ ( ) < < ( )V V a a a a/ / when 3Newton 0 Newton 1/4 Newton 0
If one interprets the left hand side of Eq. (3) as a measure of the
dark matter (which is the interpretation given to it in the standard
model), the right hand side implies that the dark matter dis-
tribution is strictly tied to that of the normal matter, and fur-
thermore that the relation is a simple algebraic one.2926 See footnote 7. In this paragraph, ‘acceleration’ means ‘force per unit mass’.
27 On the other hand, until the measurement of galactic rotation curves in the
1970s, these theories were never tested in regimes of such low acceleration;
aNewton44a0 everywhere in the Solar System.
28 The directly observable quantity is not mass but radiation: the light (from
the stars) and the radio emission (from the gas). Techniques exist for relating those
observables to mass with relatively little uncertainty (e.g. Lelli, McGaugh &
Schombert, 2016).
29 The reader may wonder how it ever occurred to anyone to plot the rotation-
curve data in this non-intuitive way, rather than as (for instance) V/VNewton vs ra-
dius. The intriguing answer is given in Famaey & McGaugh (2012).There is a class of galaxies, the so-called low-surface-brightness
galaxies, in which the density of normal matter is so low that
aNewtonooa0 everywhere, even near the center (Bothun, Impey &
McGaugh, 1997). In the standard model, such galaxies would be
‘dark-matter dominated’ everywhere: the gravitational force
throughout the galaxy would be due almost entirely to the dark
matter. The standard model has produced no algorithm for pre-
dicting, in detail, the distribution of dark matter in such a galaxy
(or any particular galaxy for that matter), and there is no reason to
expect the dark matter to be rigorously controlled by the much
smaller amount of normal matter. Nevertheless, low surface
brightness galaxies accurately obey Eq. (3) (McGaugh & de Blok,
1998; de Blok & McGaugh, 1998).
Explaining observed correlations is an aspect of what Kuhn
calls ‘normal science’. What distinguishes the mass discrepancy–
acceleration relation is that it seems immune to such explanation,
at least from within the paradigm of the standard cosmological
model, no matter (as Longair might say) how many astrophysical
parameters are varied (Wu and Kroupa, 2015). Even if a relation
like that of Eq. (3) were established at some early time between
the dark and normal matter (no mechanism for doing this has yet
been proposed), it could not persist in the face of interactions
(tidal encounters, mergers) between galaxies, or processes like
star formation and galactic winds, which would affect the dark
and normal matter in substantially different ways, and the effects
of which would vary, presumably randomly, from galaxy to
galaxy.30 But the correlation plotted in Fig. 2 shows no evidence of
stochasticity, contingency, or dependence on environment. It has
more the manifestation of a natural law (McGaugh, 2014).
Framed as a prediction, the mass discrepancy–acceleration re-
lation clearly satisfies Popper’s criterion for a ‘severe’ test (“highly
improbable in the light of our previous knowledge”). No attempt
has been made to account for this anomaly within the framework
of the standard cosmological model. Instead, the mass dis-
crepancy–acceleration relation has been dealt with via the third of
Popper’s conventionalist stratagems: It has been ignored.
Simulations of galaxy formation carried out within the stan-
dard model—examples include Brook et al. (2012), Vogelsberger
et al. (2014), and Wellons et al. (2015)—routinely include com-
prehensive comparisons of the properties of the simulated ga-
laxies with observed properties and correlations. By ‘adjusting the
parameters’ of star formation, gas dynamics, and other ‘sub-grid’
physics, these simulation studies sometimes do a reasonable job of
reproducing the observed relations. But comparisons with the
mass discrepancy–acceleration relation (and citations to the dis-
covery papers) are lacking from these and similar studies.
The same is true with regard to textbooks on galaxy formation
and cosmology. Before documenting that statement, it is necessary
to determine on what date the relation was first established and
published. The fact that galaxy rotation curves ‘know’ about the
distribution of light (even where the dark matter, supposedly,
dominates) has been known at least since 1980 (Rubin, Burstein &
Thonnard, 1980). The existence of a universal acceleration scale, a0,
below which observed disk-galaxy rotation velocities exceed
VNewton, was well established by 1983 (Milgrom, 1983). Correlation
plots like the one shown here in Fig. 2 were published at least as
early as 1990 (Sanders, 1990; McGaugh, 1998); the relation ap-
pears to have been given its current name in 2004 (McGaugh,
2004).
The role of textbooks in defining a scientific paradigm has been
discussed by Thomas Kuhn:
They [the textbooks] address themselves to an already30 This randomness is clearly observed in the distributions of stars and gas.
Fig. 1. Results of dark matter direct-detection experiments. The abscissa is the mass of the putative dark matter particle; the proton has a mass of about one in these units.
The ordinate is the putative cross section for interaction of a dark matter particle with nuclei of normal matter. The curves are upper limits set by various experiments;
regions that lie above these curves are excluded with high confidence. The left panel shows results from experiments that had been completed by about 2002 (red: Benoit
et al., 2001, EDELWEISS; black: Abusaidi et al., 2000, CDMS; green: Barton et al., 2003, ZEPLIN). The right panel shows experiments that had been completed by about 2015
(black: Agnese et al. 2015, CDMS II; magenta: Aprile, 2012, XENON100; cyan: Akerib et al., 2016, LUX). The shaded regions represent theoretical expectations, based on some
hypothesized extension of the standard model of particle physics. The light red region in the left panel is from Ellis, Ferstl, and Olive (2000); the blue and green regions (68%
and 90% confidence respectively) are from Trotta et al. (2008). As the experimental limits have become tighter, cosmologists have postulated ever more extreme properties
for the dark matter particles. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 1
Graduate-level texts on cosmology and/or galaxy formation published after 2004. Q1¼ “Is the failure of laboratory experiments to detect dark matter discussed?” Q2¼“Is the
existence of a universal acceleration scale a0 discussed?” Q3¼ “Is the mass discrepancy–acceleration relation discussed?”.
Date Author(s) Title Q1 Q2 Q3
2005 J.A. Gonzalo Inflationary Cosmology Revisited: An Overview of Contemporary Scientific Cosmology After the Inflationary
Proposal
No No No
2005 J.F. Hawley, K.A. Holcomb Foundations of Modern Cosmology Yes No No
2005 F. Hoyle, G. Burbidge, J.V. Narlikar A Different Approach to Cosmology No No No
2005 D.-E. Liebscher Cosmology No No No
2005 V. Mukhanov Physical Foundations of Cosmology No No No
2005 S. Phillipps The Structure and Evolution of Galaxies No No No
2007 L.S. Sparke, J.S. Gallagher Galaxies in the Universe: An Introduction No No No
2007 W.C. Keel The Road to Galaxy Formation No No No
2008 S. Weinberg Cosmology Yes No No
2008 M. Longair Galaxy Formation Yes No No
2008 J.M. Overduin, P.S. Wesson The Light/Dark Universe: Light from Galaxies, Dark Matter and Dark Energy Yes No No
2008 M. Giovannini A Primer on the Physics of the Cosmic Microwave Background No No No
2009 A. Liddle, J. Loveday The Oxford Companion to Cosmology No Yes No
2010 L. Amendola, S. Tsujikawa Dark Energy: Theory and Observations No No No
2010 S. Serjeant Observational Cosmology Yes No No
2010 H. Mo, F. van den Bosch, S. White Galaxy Formation and Evolution No No No
2010 T.-P. Cheng Relativity, Gravitation and Cosmology: A Basic Introduction No No No
2010 J. Rich Fundamentals of Cosmology Yes No No
2010 P. Ruiz-Lapuente Dark Energy: Observational and Theoretical Approaches No No No
2010 Y. Wang Dark Energy No No No
2011 S. Capozziello and V. Faraoni. Beyond Einstein Gravity: A Survey of Gravitational Theories for Cosmology and Astrophysics No No No
2011 S. Matarrese et al. Dark Matter and Dark Energy: A Challenge for Modern Cosmology Yes No No
2012 M. Bojowald The Universe: A View from Classical and Quantum Gravity No No No
2012 G. F. R. Ellis et al. Relativistic Cosmology No No No
2013 P. Peter, J.-P. Ulan Primordial Cosmology Yes Yes No
2014 J. Einasto Dark Matter and Cosmic Web Story No No No
2015 T.-P. Cheng A College Course on Relativity, Gravitation and Cosmology: A Basic Introduction Yes No No
2015 C. Deffayet et al. Post-Planck Cosmology No No No
2015 M. H. Jones et al. An Introduction to Galaxies and Cosmology Yes No No
2015 A. Liddle An Introduction to Modern Cosmology Yes No No
2015 D. Majumdar Dark Matter: An Introduction Yes No No
2015 M. Roos Introduction to Cosmology Yes No No
2015 P. Schneider Extragalactic Astronomy and Cosmology: An Introduction Yes No No
2016 D. Lyth Cosmology for Physicists No No No
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Fig. 2. The ‘mass discrepancy–acceleration relation’ (Sanders, 1990; McGaugh, 1998, 2004). Each point is a measured value, at one position in one galaxy. Points toward the
left (low acceleration) are farthest from the galaxy center. Many different galaxies and galaxy types (size, morphology, surface brightness) are included. The fact VZVNewton is
the basis for the dark matter hypothesis. This figure shows in addition that the observed V is strictly predictable, at every location in every galaxy, given only the value of the
gravitational force from the normal matter. Such a relation is extremely difficult to understand under the dark matter hypothesis, for the reasons discussed in the text. The
dashed vertical line is roughly a0 ; wherever in a galaxy aNewton44a0, the observed V is correctly predicted by Newton’s laws, i.e. VEVNewton.
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the particular set of paradigms to which the scientific com-
munity is committed at the time they are written. Textbooks
themselves aim to communicate the vocabulary and syntax of a
contemporary scientific language. (Kuhn, 1962, p. 136.).
If Kuhn’s characterization of textbooks is correct, they are an ex-
cellent source of information about the current state of a scientific
theory.
Here I take the conservative view that only textbooks published
in 2005 or later could be expected to discuss either the existence
of a universal acceleration scale, or the mass discrepancy–accel-
eration relation. (Included in that subset are textbooks that were
first published prior to 2005 but which appeared in revised or
updated editions after 2004.)31 A list of such texts is given in Ta-
ble 1. The list is intended to be complete: it includes every, or
nearly every, book published during this period that presents the
subjects of cosmology and/or galaxy formation at a level suitable
for a graduate course in astrophysics. Conference proceedings are
excluded, as are popular and semi-popular books.
None of the texts mentions the mass discrepancy–acceleration
relation. Only two—Liddle and Loveday’s Oxford Companion to
Cosmology (2009), and Peter and Uzan's Primordial Cosmology
(2013)—mention the existence of the universal acceleration scale
a0. Interestingly, the two textbooks that take a self-styled ‘non-
standard’ view of cosmological theory—by Hoyle, Burbidge, and
Narlikar (2005) and Capozziello and Faraoni (2011)—fail to men-
tion either the acceleration scale or the mass discrepancy–accel-
eration relation.7. Conventionalism vs. progress
Karl Popper believed that in order to maintain the falsifiability
of a scientific theory, conventionalist stratagems should be avoi-
ded. It was argued above that some important elements of the
standard cosmological model are conventionalist in the sense
defined by Popper. At this point, it seems natural to depart from a
strictly Popperian analysis and ask: Does it matter that the31 Discussions of the observational evidence for an accelerating universe and
its interpretation in terms of ‘dark energy’ began appearing in textbooks almost
immediately after the papers in 1998 and 1999 that described the anomaly; ex-
amples are Rees (2001), Raine and Thomas (2001), and Ryden (2003).standard model is conventionalist? If so, why? And what are the
implications, if any, for the progress of cosmology as a science?
Thomas Kuhn and Imre Lakatos expressed similar views on the
role played by conventionalist stratagems in the progress of science.
As summarized by Anthony O’Hear, Kuhn argued that
during a period of what he [Kuhn] calls ‘normal’ science, the
paradigm is protected from falsification. Counter-evidence to
the paradigm, in the shape of falsified predictions, is treated as
merely anomalous data, to be explained away in due course…
Normal scientists will, in Popperian terminology, resort to
conventionalist stratagems to deflect criticism from their
paradigm. Sometimes these will produce new knowledge, as in
the case of the discovery of Neptune. But sometimes they won’t,
as in the case of Mercury’s orbit. (O’Hear, 1989, pp. 66-67.).
On this view, cold dark matter and dark energy might play a role
similar to the role played by a postulated planet (Neptune) in
explaining anomalies in Uranus’s orbit. Or they might play a role
like that of the mythical planet Vulcan, which was invoked (in-
correctly) to explain the apsidal shift of Mercury’s orbit.32
Like Kuhn, Lakatos recognized the tendency of scientists to
invoke ad hoc hypotheses in order to protect the ‘core’ of a re-
search program. Lakatos proposed a distinction between two sorts
of incorporation, which he called progressive and degenerative:
A research programme is said to be progressing as long as its
theoretical growth anticipates its empirical growth, that is as
long as it keeps predicting novel facts with some success
(“progressive problemshift”); it is stagnating if its theoretical
growth lags behind its empirical growth, that is as long as it
gives only post-hoc explanations either of chance discoveries or
of facts anticipated by, and discovered in, a rival programme
(“degenerating problemshift”) (Lakatos, 1971, pp. 104–105).In a progressive research program, according to Lakatos, changes
are driven by the program’s inner logic, not by awkward empirical32 A more apt comparison here would be with phlogiston or luminiferous ae-
ther. Just as in the case of dark matter or dark energy, the assumed properties of
these hypothesized substances were modified over time in response to new ex-
perimental data; see e.g. Partington and McKie (1981).
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generates. Furthermore, when additions are made to a theory,
Lakatos insisted that (at least some of) this “excess content” be
corroborated by subsequent experiments or observations if the
theory is to be considered progressive (Lakatos, 1970).
As with all theories of scientific progress, Lakatos’ criteria can
be criticized, in respect to their generality or their correspondence
with the historical record. Here I take Lakatos’ ideas "as read" and
ask what they imply for the standard model of cosmology.
The current arc of cosmological theory clearly fails to meet the
standards set by Lakatos for a progressive research program.
Nothing in the pre-existing model (ca. 1970) pointed toward the
need for dark matter or dark energy; the observations that moti-
vated these hypotheses came as a complete surprise. Nor was the
mass discrepancy–acceleration relation anticipated before it was
established observationally.33 Furthermore a great deal of current
effort in the field—perhaps the bulk of the effort—is directed to-
ward coping with the discrepancies. It has been quite a long time
—perhaps not since the 1960s—that developments in the field
were driven by its inner logic, rather than by unanticipated ob-
servational facts (Kroupa, 2012).
The evolution of the standard model has also clearly failed to
satisfy Lakatos’ criterion of “incorporation with corroborated ex-
cess content”. The failure to directly detect the particles making up
the dark matter—and hence to corroborate the dark matter hy-
pothesis—was detailed above. Mordehai Milgrom (1989) notes,
more generally, that the dark matter hypothesis
has, so far, proven a great disappointment as a scientific hy-
pothesis. To my knowledge, it has not given rise to a single
unavoidable prediction; it has not produced any hitherto un-
expected relations between galactic phenomena. The DM hy-
pothesis simply states that dark matter is present in whatever
quantities and space distribution is needed to explain away
whichever mass discrepancy arises.
At the same time, Lakatos did not recognize any rigorous cri-
terion for deciding, on the short term, whether changes or addi-
tions to a theoretical system will contribute to its long-term suc-
cess: “The old rationalist dream of a mechanical, semi-mechanical
or at least fast-acting method for showing up falsehood, un-
provenness, meaningless rubbish or even non-rational choice has
to be given up…It is very difficult to decide, especially if one does
not demand progress at each single step, when a research pro-
gramme has degenerated hopelessly” (Lakatos, 1978, p. 149).34 Versions of this argument can be found in many of the texts listed in Table 1,
e.g. Hawley and Holcomb (2005, p.428), Schneider (2015, p. 457), Heacox (2016, p.
175).
35 One of the seven numbers is the mean density of radiation in the universe.
This quantity is directly measurable with good precision and is usually considered8. Convergence
There is however one criterion that is widely viewed—by many
scientists, and by at least some philosophers of science—as in-
dicating that a theory is successful: the criterion of convergence.
When a host of different experiments that presuppose a certain
theory produce results that are consistent and compatible with the
theory—for instance, by yielding a common value for a certain
physical constant—there is a strong motivation to accept the
theory as correct, or at least as an advance over pre-existing the-
ories that did not have this characteristic. In the words of Hilary
Putnam (1975), such agreement would seem “miraculous” unless
the underlying theory were correct.
Jean Perrin made this argument in 1913, in favor of the atomic
theory of matter. Perrin noted that Avogadro’s number appears in
equations that describe many different phenomena: Brownian33 At least, not by researchers working within the standard paradigm. See note
29.motion, electrolysis, radioactive decay, the black-body spectrum
etc.:
Our wonder is aroused at the very remarkable agreement
found between values [of Avogadro’s number] derived from the
consideration of such widely different phenomena. Seeing that
not only is the same magnitude obtained by each method when
the conditions under which it is applied are varied as much as
possible, but that the numbers thus established also agree
among themselves, without discrepancy, for all the methods
employed, the real existence of the molecule is given prob-
ability bordering on certainty. (Perrin, 1913, pp. 215–216.).
Max Planck argued in a similar way that the agreement between
different experimental determinations of the constant h (Planck’s
constant) constituted strong support for the quantization of en-
ergy (Planck, 1922, pp. 496–500).
A similar argument is often made by cosmologists with regard
to the standard cosmological model. The argument goes as
follows:34 The universe (on sufficiently large spatial scales, and as
described in terms of Einstein’s equations) can be parametrized in
terms of a small set of numbers; at a minimum, six or seven are
required.35 These include the current mean densities of normal
matter, dark matter, and dark energy; the current expansion rate;
and the parameters that define the initial power spectrum of
density perturbations. Now, there turns out to exist a choice for
this set of numbers that is consistent with most of the observa-
tional tests that have been devised to date. This ‘concordance’ (the
term favored by cosmologists) between different data sets is said
to be compelling evidence for the correctness of the standard
model, and by extension, for the existence of dark matter and dark
energy. For instance, Olive et al. (2014) write: “The concordance
model is now well established, and there seems little room left for
any dramatic revision of this paradigm.”
But the concordance argument made by Olive and others is
substantially weaker than the convergence arguments made by
Perrin and Planck, for a number of reasons.
1. In the instances discussed by Perrin (Avagadro’s number) and
Planck (Planck’s constant), it was the agreement of the measured
value of a single parameter, in multiple experiments, that lent
credence to the reality of atoms and energy quantization respec-
tively. But most of the parameters that define the concordance
cosmological model have not been determined independently of
each other. This is because—in most of the observational tests—
there is substantial degeneracy between the best-fit values of two
or more of the parameters. One example was mentioned above: in
applying the ‘Hubble diagram’ test,36 there is degeneracy between
the parameters that define the matter density and the dark energy
density: the larger the value assumed for one, the larger the value
implied for the other. A similar degeneracy, but in the opposite
sense, exists in tests based on angular fluctuations in the cosmic
background radiation: in this case, the larger the assumed matter
density, the smaller the implied dark energy density (Kowalski
et al., 2008). A third example is the angular power spectrum of
galaxies, which is predicted to evolve in a particular way as ga-
laxies and their attendant dark matter cluster gravitationally;
these data provide a useful constraint on the mean matter densityto be known.
36 Often referred to by cosmologists as the “supernova test” since most of the
distant data points in the Hubble diagram are derived from observations of
supernovae.
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density (Eisenstein et al., 2005).37 When cosmologists speak of
‘concordance’, they mean that it is possible to find a single set of
parameters that provides an acceptable fit to the conjunction of
observational data sets, and not that there is independent con-
firmation of the value of any single parameter. This is a funda-
mentally weaker sort of convergence than what Perrin and Planck
were talking about,38 and it is correspondingly less compelling in
terms of justifying the correctness of the ΛCDM model.
2. Some of the parameters that define the concordance model
can be well constrained from the observations, in a way that is
independent or nearly independent of the other parameters. But
the values so obtained tend to be at variance with the concordance
values. One example is Hubble’s constant, H0, which measures
the current rate of cosmological expansion. Determination of
H0 using the classical redshift-magnitude test (the ‘Hubble
diagram’) has consistently yielded higher values than the
‘concordance’ value; a recent study (Riess et al. 2016) finds
H0¼73.0371.79 km s1 Mpc1 compared with the concordance
value of 67.370.7 km s1 Mpc1, a ‘three-sigma discrepancy’. A
more striking example concerns the mean density of normal (non-
dark) matter; cosmologists call this the ‘baryon density’.39 The
density of baryonic matter is well constrained by the requirement
that nucleosynthesis shortly after the Big Bang produce the ob-
served abundances of the light elements:40 deuterium, helium,
lithium and their isotopes. But there is a factor of two discrepancy
between the baryon density inferred in this way from the ob-
served lithium abundance and the concordance value (this is the
‘Lithium problem’ mentioned in Section 2).41
3. Discussions of the concordance model never take into ac-
count the mass discrepancy–acceleration relation. In one sense,
this is justified by the fact that the concordance model defines the
structure and evolution of the universe only on the largest spatial
scales. But as discussed above, the mass discrepancy–acceleration
relation conflicts in an apparently irreconcilable way with the in-
terpretation of galaxy rotation curves in terms of dark matter. And
as documented above, this awkward fact is simply ignored.
An even more fundamental point can be made about the con-
vergence/concordance argument (Losee, 2004). Perrin, by noting
agreement between different determinations of Avogadro’s num-
ber, was arguing in favor of theories that incorporate an atomic-
molecular description of matter. He was not arguing for any par-
ticular atomic theory. In the same way, Planck’s argument was for a
progression to theories that incorporate energy quantization; he
was not claiming that the agreement between different mea-
surements of h warranted the selection of any particular version of
(what we would now call) quantum mechanics. These scientists37 In applying this and other tests, it is common practice simply to fix certain of
the parameters based on theoretical preconceptions; for instance, the universe is
often assumed to have zero curvature even when the data being confronted do not
require it.
38 Because, for instance, the number of cosmological parameters to be de-
termined is comparable to the number of tests that constrain them. By contrast,
Perrin listed sixteen experiments that yielded independent measurements of
Avagadro’s number.
39 ‘Baryonic matter’ also includes leptons (electrons), mesons, and all the other
standard-model particles.
40 Only light elements undergo nuclear reactions at sufficiently high rates for
their abundances to be changed significantly during this short interval of time.
41 The baryon density inferred from the abundances of the other light nuclei
(deuterium, helium) was originally consistent with the low value inferred from
lithium—a fine example of convergence. But following publication of the con-
cordance model around 2000, the baryon densities inferred from these other two
elements have drifted upward, so that both values are now consistent with the
concordance value and inconsistent with the lithium value. Results obtained from
lithium have remained unchanged. The reasons for this are not entirely clear;
confirmation bias has been suggested (McGaugh, 2015).were arguing, on the grounds of convergence of the value of a
measured parameter, for transition from one type of theory to
another. They were not arguing for the correctness of any single
theory about atomic interactions or energy quantization.
In the same way: even if one stipulates that convergence, in the
strong sense discussed by Perrin and Planck, could one day be
established with regard to the cosmological parameters, this in
itself would not mandate belief in any particular cosmological
model. It would only imply that a transition is warranted: from
models (such as the standard model ca. 1970) that contained
nothing corresponding to dark matter or dark energy; to models
that include one or more ‘dark sectors.’ Convergence, on its own,
would provide no evidence for the existence of particle dark
matter, since there is nothing in the concordance model, or the
observations that motivated it, that requires the ‘dark matter’
component to be particulate: the only apparent requirement is
that this component respond gravitationally, on large scales, like
ordinary matter. And on smaller (galactic) scales, the dark sectors
of the new model would need to reproduce the mass discrepancy–
acceleration relation, something which the current model makes
no attempt to do.9. Discovery in cosmology
The expression “conventionalist stratagem” seems to imply in-
tent: intent to maintain the integrity of a theory by circumventing
a falsifying experiment. Nothing in Popper’s definitions of con-
ventionalist stratagems necessarily implies intent, however, and
the arguments given above are likewise unaffected by the (un-
knowable) motivations of cosmologists. But it is natural to ask how
cosmologists themselves describe the elements which here have
been described as conventionalist.
In the textbooks listed in Table 1, it is easy to find statements
like the following (emphasis added):
We know that the cosmological constant [Λ] exists because of its
gravitational effect. This is the same as the situation for the CDM
[cold dark matter] and for that reason, the vacuum energy is
sometimes called dark energy. [Lyth (2016), p. 53]
Even more surprising than the existence of dark matter is the
discovery that about 70% of the Universe consists of something
that today is called vacuum energy, or dark energy, and that is
closely related to the cosmological constant introduced by Al-
bert Einstein. [Schneider (2015), p. 5]
Before the observational discovery of dark energy in 1998, most
people believed that the cosmological constant is exactly zero
and tried to explain why it is so. [Matarrese et al. (2011), p. 343]
The discovery that almost three-quarters of the present cosmic
energy density is to be ascribed to an almost uniform dark energy
component able to produce, via its negative isotropic pressure,
the accelerated expansion of the Universe, represents the most
severe crisis of contemporary physics. [Matarrese
et al. (2011), p. xi].
These statements suggest that—rather than conceive of dark
matter or dark energy as postulates invoked in response to falsi-
fying observations—cosmologists interpret those same observa-
tions as tantamount to the discovery of dark matter or dark energy.
The logic seems to be:
1. Newton’s theory of gravity and motion is correct (in the weak-
field regime appropriate to galaxies).
2. In the absence of unseen mass, Newton’s laws imply that galaxy
rotation curves must fall.
3. Galaxy rotation curves are observed to be asymptotically flat.
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or:
1. Einstein’s theory of gravity and motion is correct.
2. In the absence of a universal component with the properties of
dark energy, Einstein’s equations imply that the cosmological
expansion rate must decrease over time.
3. The expansion rate is observed to increase over time.
∴ There must be dark energy.
The assumption that Newton’s or Einstein’s theories must be cor-
rect, even in the face of falsifying instances, recalls Popper’s words:
“Whenever the ‘classical’ system of the day is threatened by the
results of new experiments which might be interpreted as falsifi-
cations according to my point of view, the system will appear
unshaken to the conventionalist.”Acknowledgements
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